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Abstract 
This paper explores recent developments in the regulation of Internet speech, in specific, injurious or defamatory speech and the impact such 
speech has on the rights of anonymous speakers to remain anonymous as opposed to having their identity revealed to plaintiffs or other third 
parties. The paper proceeds in four sections.  First, a brief history of the legal attempts to regulate defamatory Internet speech in the United 
States is presented. As discussed below this regulation has altered the traditional legal paradigm of responsibility and as a result creates 
potential problems for the future of anonymous speech on the Internet.  As a result plaintiffs are no longer pursuing litigation against service 
providers but taking their dispute directly to the anonymous speaker. Second, several cases have arisen in the United States where plaintiffs 
have requested that the identity of an anonymous Internet speaker be revealed.  These cases are surveyed.  Third, the cases are analyzed in 
order to determine the factors that courts require to be present before the identity of an anonymous speaker will be revealed.  The release is 
typically accomplished by the enforcement of a discovery subpoena instigated by the party seeking the identity of the anonymous speaker. 
The factors courts have used are as follows: jurisdiction, good faith (both internal and external), necessity (basic and sometimes absolute), 
and at times proprietary interest. Finally, these factors are applied in three scenarios—e-commerce, education, and employment—to guide 
institutions when adopting policies that regulate when the identity of an anonymous speaker—a customer, a student or an employee—would 
be released as part of an internal initiative, but would nonetheless be consistent with developing legal standards.  
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Introduction 
The value of anonymous speech in society is regarded as a 
cornerstone of democratic government.  This position also 
applies to Internet speech.  However, recent legal devel-
opments in the Untied States, pressure actors harmed by 
such speech to seek recourse from the actual speaker, as 
opposed to an intermediate actor such as the technological 
equivalent of traditional publisher, the online service pro-
vider.  This pressure means that in increasing numbers the 
identity of those anonymous speakers will be sought.  
Several courts have dealt with the factors under which a 
legal request in the form of a subpoena to obtain the iden-
tity of an anonymous speaker will be granted.  These fac-
tors are identified and discussed.  As a result several pre-
dictors can be established that indicate the circumstances 
under which future subpoenas will succeed.  These predic-
tors can also be used to draft organizational policies re-
garding anonymous speech that would conform to legal 
precedent thus making anonymous speakers—those spe-
cific to the organization as well as anonymous speakers in 
general—aware of the circumstance under which their 
anonymity might be breeched.  The purpose of this itera-
tion is to indicate how internal institutional policy forma-
tion or decision-making can be undertaken consistent with 
the principles of the developing law.  This in turn serves to 
make the circumstances surrounding the expression of 
anonymous speech within the organization legally compli-
ant. 
Background: Defamation 
In general, an action for defamation requires a showing 
that the plaintiff has been exposed to hatred, contempt or 
ridicule, or that it causes a person to be shunned or 
avoided or otherwise injures his or her standing in the 
community (Keeton and Prosser, 1984, 773).  The four 
elements of a claim for defamation are: a false and de-
famatory statement, that is published to one or more third 
parties without privilege, by a publisher who is at least 
negligent in communicating the information, and that re-
sults in presumed or actual damage (Street and Grant, 
2001, §6.02, at 6-3). Typically, those who act as a pub-
lisher or re-publisher (Restatement of Torts §578) of de-
famatory material are also liable with the speaker or writer 
of the defamation. The law imposes this burden on the 
intermediary as publisher for several reasons.  First, as the 
publisher benefits economically from the publication, so it 
should also share in its social cost.  Second the publisher 
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may have resources or be in the most efficient position to 
intercede in preventing the harm, i.e., it can halt or cease 
publication of the harmful material.  Finally, imposing 
liability of publishers is a form of risk allocation; if an 
individual author would carry the sole burden of responsi-
bility for defamatory harms, future speakers (authors) 
might be less willing to speak (write), and future speech 
might be chilled.  In this way, publishers offset the cost of 
a single harm against the profits received from numerous 
other authors’ successes.   
Another category of intermediary is known as a distribu-
tor.  However, distributors are not liable, unless the dis-
tributor knows or has reason to know of the defamatory 
nature of the publication it distributes, through sales, rent-
als, loans, etc. The law draws a distinction between a true 
publisher or re-publisher for that matter, of a defamatory 
statement and a mere distributor of a defamatory state-
ment.  “Examples of such distributors include libraries, 
bookstores, and news vendors” (Talbot, 1999, §10.4, at 10-
4).  Another category of intermediary is the conduit or the 
common carrier.  Common carriers, a telecommunication 
service provider such as a telephone company, are gener-
ally not liable for defamatory messages sent by third par-
ties over its systems, as a common carrier is neither a pub-
lisher nor distributor.  However, in cyberspace parties act-
ing as mere intermediaries (distributor or common carrier), 
traditionally secure from such actions, may be exposed to 
liability given the unsettled nature of the Internet legal 
environment.  Technological advances often blur the legal 
distinction between the intermediary (distributor and gen-
erally not liable), and the information creator and producer 
(author or publisher, generally liable).  This operates to 
compound the legal problematic. Electronic publishing is a 
good case in point (Counts and Martin, 1996; Talbot, 
1999, §10.15).  A web site operator that cuts, pastes, grafts 
or otherwise edits content onto its web site has arguably 
moved beyond the function of a mere conduit or distribu-
tor and is now acting more like a traditional publisher or 
editor.  The ability to achieve instantaneous and prolonged 
distribution of a work in cyberspace may also confuse the 
line between distributor (no liability unless know or reason 
to know standard is met) and true publisher. Unlike some 
jurisdictions, the United States generally follows a single 
publication rule, i.e., publish 20,000 copies of a book con-
taining defamatory content and courts will view the press-
ing of a particular copy of the book and its subsequent sale 
(distribution) as a single publication, not 20,000 distribu-
tions, i.e., 20,000 separate acts of defamation.  The single 
publication rule has been extended to the Internet; while 
the act of making defamatory material available over the 
Internet might constitute a “publication,” in the absence of 
some alteration or change in form, its continued availabil-
ity on the Internet does not constitute a republication each 
time it is accessed, read, or even forwarded, that would 
start the statute of limitations running anew with each in-
teraction. (Firth v. State of New York; Van Buskirk v. The 
New York Times Co.)  It should also be observed that 
defamation in other jurisdictions, especially those inherit-
ing from the English legal tradition, may not distinguish 
between the author and publisher, and distributor, or pro-
vide only limited protection to distributors.  (Lipinski, Bu-
chanan, and Britz, 2002)  It is the strong protection that 
speech receives under the U.S. Constitution that accounts 
for the application of differing legal standards and often 
contributes to opposite outcomes in similar defamation 
suits in the United States, versus for example, the United 
Kingdom. 
Even within the United States, the developing law is often 
inconsistent, with one infamous decision holding that an 
online service provider (thought to be at most a mere con-
duit or distributor) liable for the defamatory postings of 
third parties on its system (Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prod-
igy Services Co.).  In Stratton Oakmont, the court was per-
suaded by evidence that suggested the online service pro-
vider Prodigy acted more like a publisher than a distributor 
when it appointed a board moderator, used filtering soft-
ware to regulate content and held itself out as a family 
oriented (another indication of content control) network 
access provider.  At the same time several legislative ini-
tiatives in the United States concerned with regulating the 
content of information available to children on the Internet 
and in other media have appeared, such as the V-Chip leg-
islation (officially known as the Parental Choice in Televi-
sion Programming Act, codified at 47 U.S.C. §303), the 
Children’s Online Protection Act (codified at 47 U.S.C. 
§231), regulating access by minors to commercial pornog-
raphy on the World Wide Web, and the Children’s Internet 
Protection Act requiring filtering software in qualifying 
schools and libraries (adding 20 U.S.C. §3601, and 
amending 20 U.S.C. §9143 and 47 U.S.C. §254).  In con-
junction with the V-Chip initiative Congress added 47 
U.S.C. §230(c) to the federal communication law offering 
“immunity” to online service providers (both provisions 
were part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996). Con-
gress sought, in section 230(c), to ensure that online ser-
vice providers, when attempting to promote the national 
policy of protecting children and others from obscene or 
indecent material online, would not be viewed as the edi-
tor of that content (at least when their efforts at protection, 
alteration, modification, etc. failed) and be placed into the 
“publisher” category of actors for purposes of liability as-
sessment. This new section of the federal communication 
law overrules the decision in Stratton Oakmont. (Confer-
ence Report, 1996, 194) 
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Developments: Section 230  
and Recent Precedent 
In passing Section 230 Congress commented that “[t]hese 
protections apply to all interactive computer services 
[ICS], as defined in new subsection 230(f)(2), including 
non-subscriber systems such as those operated by many 
businesses for employee use” (Conference Report, 1996, 
194).  Section 230(f)(2) defines an ICS as “any informa-
tion service, system, or access software provider that pro-
vides or enables computer access by multiple users to a 
computer server, including specifically a service or system 
that provides access to the Internet and such systems oper-
ated or services offered by libraries or educational institu-
tions.”   Subsequent case law interpreted the Section 230 
“protections” as offering complete immunity for all harms 
associated with third party content creation on the Internet 
(Zeran v. America Online, Inc.: defamation; Blumenthal v. 
Drudge: defamation; Ben Ezra, Einstein & Co. v. Ameri-
can Online, Inc.: defamation and negligence; Doe v. 
American Online, Inc.: negligence, Stoner v. eBay. Inc.: 
business law; Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore: nuisance).  
Although these developments have been criticized (Wie-
ner, 1999; Ballon, 1997; Kane, 1999; Spencer, 2000), ex-
pansion of Section 230 immunity continues, even to public 
libraries in contexts other than defamation.  In, Kathleen 
R. v. City of Livermore, the court granted a defendant’s 
motion for summary judgment when the library patron-
plaintiff claimed that a lack of filtering software on Inter-
net access terminals caused her child to be exposed to 
harmful materials.  The court relied in part on Section 230 
in providing tort immunity from harmful material that the 
library, as a conduit, made accessible through its connec-
tion to the Internet, i.e., the library did not create the con-
tent nor provide a link, nor was the mere provision of 
Internet access deemed a publication, thus no publisher, or 
intermediary liability.   
Legal precedent establishes that those who act in the ca-
pacity of re-publishers of defamatory material and not as 
mere distributors are equally liable for the defamatory ma-
terial as is the initial publisher.  The question here is 
whether there exist circumstances whereby the online ser-
vice provider, bulletin board operator, etc. would move out 
of its traditional role as mere distributor and be placed in 
the position of a re-publisher or creator of defamatory or 
otherwise harmful content.  According to Street those in-
formation or service providers that “claim to exercise edi-
torial control or do in fact exercise editorial control . . . are 
likely to be treated as publishers and held liable for defa-
mation in the materials they publish” (Street, 2000, §6-
2(b), at 625-626, see also, Zuckman, Et al., 1999, Section 
5.10, at 612). 
It could be argued that through its web site, through link-
ing, cutting and pasting or uploading content the informa-
tion organization or educational institution has moved be-
yond the mere provision of online service (conduit).  Ini-
tially, Section 230 immunity was targeted at those Internet 
or Online Service Providers (OSP) that attempt to filter or 
control the access of harmful content on their systems, 
whether through manual editing as in Stratton Oakmont or 
through technological means such as software filters con-
templated by Section 230(c)(2)(b).  The new law specifi-
cally includes a library or educational institution within 
the definition of OSP or “Internet or other Interactive 
Computer Services.”  See, 47 U.S.C. §230(f).  Section 
230(c) provides “immunity” by stating that in these situa-
tions the OSP or Interactive Computer Services (to use the 
statutory phrasing) Provider (ICSP), should not be treated 
as a creator or editor of content but as a mere distributor.  
As long as the content comes from a third party, regardless 
of how it is incorporated into an institutional web site, 
courts have consistently concluded that the institution as 
service provider will be immune from liability for defama-
tion and for other torts as well.  As a result, plaintiffs seek-
ing redress have only one alternative left: pursue remedy 
against the original speaker or tortfeasor.  But what if the 
harm was committed online, and the tortfeasor acted 
anonymously? 
Anonymous Internet Speech: Background 
In United States law, the right to free speech is a corner-
stone of constitutional jurisprudence.  Concomitant with 
the right to speak is the right to speak anonymously.  There 
is historical as well as judicial precedent to support this 
conclusion. (See Table 1.)  In several cases, Talley v. Cali-
fornia, McIntyre. v. Ohio Election Commission and Buck-
ley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, the right 
to speak anonymously has been reiterated by the Supreme 
Court, in specific, the right to distribute material anony-
mously without any personal identification.  However, it 
must be observed that previous Supreme Court precedent 
involved political speech (handbills, campaign literature, 
petition drives).  Nonetheless, the Court in Reno v. ACLU 
observed that the principles of free speech apply to the 
Internet and extend to protect those who use the Internet as 
a “soapbox,” an updated version of the eighteenth or nine-
teenth century “pamphleteer.”  The recent 2002 Supreme 
Court opinion in Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of 
New York v. Village of Stratton, arguably expands that pro-
tection to an array of speech, including political and reli-
gious information that door-to-door canvassers, the target 
of the regulation in that case, might desire to distribute. 
Moreover, recent lower court precedent specifically ex-
tends this right of anonymity to the Internet (In re Sub-
poena Duces Tecum to American Online, Inc.; Doe v. 
2TheMart.com, Inc.)  The point should be made that the 
First Amendment, in a strict legal sense, has no application 
in disputes among private parties.  However, the concept 
of free speech and all of it accoutrements permeates 
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American social fabric including the Internet and courts 
often adopt the legal nomenclature and rationale of these 
constitutional issues even when adjudicating non-
constitutional issues. 
Case   Subject of Anonymous Speech  Rationale* 
N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 
449 (1958).  
The Court overturned a finding of contempt against the NAACP for its 
refusal to turn over its membership lists, after being ordered to do so by an 
Alabama state court judge.  
I 
Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 
(1960).  
Invalidating a California statute prohibiting the distribution of “any hand-
bill in any place under any circumstances” that did not contain the name 
and address of the person who prepared it. 
Identification and fear of reprisal might deter “perfectly peaceful discus-
sions of public matters of importance.” 363 U.S. at 65. 
I  
II 
 
II? 
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Com-
mission, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).  
Overturning an Ohio law that prohibited the distribution of campaign lit-
erature that did not contain the name and address of the person issuing the 
literature. 
“[U]nder our Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is not a pernicious, 
fraudulent practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy and dissent. 
Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority.”  514 U.S. at 357.  
I 
 
 
II 
Buckley v. American Constitutional 
Law Foundation, 525 U.S. 182 
(1999).   
Invalidating, on First Amendment grounds, a Colorado statute that required 
initiative petition circulators to wear identification badges. 
I 
II 
Watchtower Bible and Tract Soci-
ety of New York v. Village of Strat-
ton, 122 S. Ct. 2080 (2002). 
Ohio village ordinance requiring door-to-door canvassing unless a “Solici-
tation Permit” is first obtained. The canvasser must then carry and display 
upon request the permit containing identity and organizational affiliation 
data.  These requirements are unconstitutional. 
I 
II** 
Reno v. A.C.L.U., 521 U.S. 844 
(1997). 
 
Internet: “Through the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line can 
become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from 
any soapbox.  Through the use of web pages, mail exploders and news-
groups, the same individual can become a pamphleteer.” 521 U.S. at 870.  
First Amendment protections extend to speech via the Internet. 
I 
II? 
 
III 
In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to 
America Online, Inc., 52 Va. 
Cir.26 (Cir. Ct. Fairfax Cnty. 
2000). 52 Va. Cir. at 32. 
“It cannot be seriously questioned that those who utilize the ‘chat rooms’ 
and ‘message boards’ of AOL do so with an expectation that the anonym-
ity of their postings and communications generally will be protected.”  
“If AOL did not uphold the confidentiality of its subscribers, as it has con-
tracted to do, absent extraordinary circumstances, [footnote omitted] one 
could reasonably predict that AOL subscribers would look to AOL's com-
petitors for anonymity. As such, the subpoena duces tecum at issue poten-
tially could have an oppressive effect on AOL.” 52 Va. Cir. at 32. 
“To fail to recognize that the First Amendment right to speak anonymously 
should be extended to communications on the Internet would require this 
Court to ignore either United States Supreme Court precedent or the reali-
ties of speech in the twenty-first century.” 52 Va. Cir. at 34.  
“This Court declines to do either and holds that the right to communicate 
anonymously on the Internet falls within the scope of the First Amend-
ment's protections.” 52 Va. Cir. at 34. 
I 
II*** 
III 
 
IV  
 
 
III 
 
 
III 
Doe v. 2TheMart.com, Inc., 140 F. 
Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2001). 
“A component of the First Amendment is the right to speak with anonym-
ity.” 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1092.  
“The right to speak anonymously extends to speech via the Internet.  Inter-
net anonymity facilitates the rich, diverse, and far ranging exchange of 
ideas.” 140 F. Supp 2d at 1092. 
II**** 
 
II**** 
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Anonymous Internet Speech: Recent 
Precedent 
Several cases involving anonymous speech on the Internet 
have arisen.  Moreover, as all intermediaries such as a 
school, library or commercial provider of an interactive 
computer service, are conceivably immune from tort li-
ability under section 230, whether acting in the capacity of 
a publisher or distributor, individuals who are harmed by 
Internet speech or other tortfeasance have but one recourse 
and that recourse is to seek remedy from the actual speaker 
or creator of the harmful content.  As a result and as dis-
cussed below, the developing precedent involves catego-
ries of harms beyond defamatory speech alone, yet all tar-
get the anonymous speaker or poster of the message.   
When speakers or creators choose to speak under the veil 
of anonymity, those harmed have sought to compel 
through legal process (a subpoena) the divulgation of the 
identity of the anonymous speaker.  The identity of the 
anonymous speaker is necessary before the legal action 
against the perpetrator (the speaker or creator) of the harm 
can continue. Thus courts are placed in the unenviable but 
inevitable position of deciding when a person’s right to 
proper redress by the courts (i.e., exercising one’s right to 
obtain his or her day in court) outweighs another person’s 
right to speak anonymously. (See Tables 2a-d for a de-
tailed summary of the issues involved in the foregoing 
cases.) 
Immunomedics, Inc. v. Doe, 775 
A.2d 773 (N.J. Super. 2001).  
“[C]ourts must decide such applications by striking a balance between the 
First Amendment right of an individual to speak anonymously and the 
right of a company to protect its proprietary interest in the pursuit of claims 
based on actionable conduct by the ISP message board user.” 775 A.2d at 
776, citing Dendrite International, Inc. v. John Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756 
(N.J. Super. 2001). 
I 
III? 
IV 
Dendrite International, Inc. v. 
John Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756 
(N.J. Super. 2001). 
“The trial court must consider and decide those applications by striking a 
balance between the well-established First Amendment right to speak 
anonymously, and the right of the plaintiff to protect its proprietary inter-
ests and reputation through the assertion of recognizable claims based on 
the actionable conduct of the anonymous, fictitiously-named defendants.” 
774 A.2d at 760. 
I 
III 
IV 
Notes:  
*Four rationales for the application of the right to speak anonymously on the Internet appear in the case law:  
(I) applicable precedent regarding free speech,  
(II) historical tradition of protecting anonymous speech,  
(III) reality of speech in the 21st century and the extension of free speech and anonymous speech concepts to the Internet, and  
(IV) promotion of competition in the Internet environment (anonymity, like privacy, is becoming a salable commodity). 
**“It is offensive—not only to the values protected by the First Amendment, but to the very notion of a free society—that in the con-
text of everyday public discourse a citizen must first inform the government of her desire to speak to her neighbors and them obtain a 
permit to do so.  Even if the issuance of permits by the mayor’s office is a ministerial task that is performed promptly and at no cost to 
the applicant, a law requiring a permit to engage in such speech constitutes a dramatic departure from our national heritage and consti-
tutional tradition.” 122 S. Ct. 2080, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 442, at *28. 
***“Inherent in the panoply of protections afforded by the First Amendment is the right to speak anonymously in diverse contexts. 
This right arises from a long tradition of American advocates speaking anonymously through pseudonyms, such as James Madison, 
Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, who authored the Federalist Papers but signed them only as ‘Publius.’” 52 Va. Cir. at 33.  
****“The right to speak anonymously was of fundamental importance to the establishment of our Constitution. Throughout the revo-
lutionary and early federal period in American history, anonymous speech and the use of pseudonyms were powerful tools of political 
debate. The Federalist Papers (authored by Madison, Hamilton, and Jay) were written anonymously under the name ‘Publius.’ The 
anti-federalists responded with anonymous articles of their own, authored by ‘Cato’ and ‘Brutus,’ among others.  See generally McIn-
tyre, 514 U.S. at 341-42. Anonymous speech is a great tradition that is woven into the fabric of this nation's history.” 140 F. Supp. 2d 
1088, 1092. 
Table 1. Development of the Right to Speak Anonymously 
The following discussion reviews the circumstances of 
several recent and relevant cases, identifies the standards 
each court used when making its determination of whether 
or not to order the release of the anonymous speaker’s 
identity, and finally attempts to characterize and categorize 
those standards into a synthesized set of common factors 
that can be used in successive litigation or adapted by an 
institution when evaluating its response to an anonymous 
speech issue, either as part of its own policy formation or 
related decision-making.  The factors are as follows and 
are explained below as the cases are discussed: jurisdic-
tion, good faith (both internal and external), necessity 
(both basic and absolute), and, at times, proprietary inter-
est. 
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Tables 2a-d. ANONYMOUS INTERNET SPEECH: STANDARD OF DISCOVERY 
Notes for Tables 2a-d:  
*The 2TheMart.com court made its decision after discussing both Columbia Insurance Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. 
Cal. 1999); and In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26 (2000). The Dendrite International, Inc. v. John 
Doe No. 3 court also discussed both previous cases in determining the applicable standard or set of factors to employ.  
**The language quoted is from Dendrite International, Inc. v. John Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2001), issued on the 
same day and by the same judge from the New Jersey Superior Court that decided Immunomedics, Inc. v. Doe.  The Dendrite Interna-
tional, Inc. v. John Doe No. 3 court articulated the standard of review in anonymous Internet speech cases involving harms resulting 
from the release of proprietary information that the Immunomedics, Inc. v. Doe court reiterated in its decision, 775 A.2d at 776-777.  
*** Several cases considered the formulation of factors in light of the harm to a proprietary interest, in all cases harm suffered by a 
corporation.  In In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc., the economic harm was the potential loss of customers in the 
absence of a policy protecting the anonymity of subscribers, and in Dendrite International, Inc. v. John Doe No. 3 and Immunomedics, 
Inc. v. Doe the harm to a proprietary interest was a direct result of the anonymous speech (the defamatory statements), in Dendrite 
International, Inc. v. John Doe No. 3, and in Immunomedics, Inc. v. Doe, as a result of breach of contract and tortious interference, 
among other claims.  
 
Case Problem  Factors  Balance 
Columbia Insurance 
Co. v. Sees-
candy.Com, 185 
F.R.D. 573 (N.D. 
Cal. 1999). 
 
Facts: 
Dispute over use of 
trademark owned by 
See’s Candy Shops, 
Inc. against anony-
mous party who 
registered sees-
candy.com and see-
candys.com. 
 
 
 
 
 
Release allowed. 
“With the rise of the Inter-
net has come the ability to 
commit certain tortious 
acts, such as defamation, 
copyright infringement, 
and trademark infringe-
ment, entirely online.” 
“Parties who have been 
injured are likely to find 
themselves, chasing the 
tortfeasor...with little or no 
hope of actually discover-
ing the identity of the tort-
feasor.” 
Jurisdiction: (Standard of Conduct) 
“[I]dentify the missing party with sufficient 
specificity such that the court can determine 
that defendant is a real person or entity who 
could be sued in Federal court.” 
 
Good Faith: Party (Internal Consistency) 
“[I]dentify all previous steps taken to locate 
the elusive defendant.  This element is aimed 
at ensuring that plaintiffs make a good faith 
effort to comply with the requirements of 
service of process and specifically identify-
ing defendants.” 
 
Legal “Good Faith”: Claim  
(External Consistency) 
“[P]laintiffs should establish to the Court’s 
satisfaction that plaintiff’s suit against de-
fendant could withstand a motion to dis-
miss.” 
 
Necessity: Basic (as to party/claim) 
“[P]laintiff should file a request for discov-
ery with the Court, along with reasons justi-
fying the specific discovery requested as 
well as identification of a limited number of 
person or entities on whom discovery proc-
ess might be served and for which there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the discovery pro-
cess will lead to identifying information 
about defendant that would make service of 
process possible.” 
“In such cases the traditional 
reluctance for permitting filings 
against John Doe defendants or 
fictitious names and the tradi-
tional enforcement of strict 
compliance with service re-
quirements should be tempered 
by the need to provide injured 
parties with an[sic] forum in 
which they might seek redress 
for grievances.” 
Balance: right of redress with 
the right to speak anonymously. 
Table 2-a. Columbia Insurance Co. v. Seescandy.com   Lipinski 
The dispute in Columbia Insurance Co. v. Seescandy.com 
(Table 2a.) did not involve a claim of defamation or any 
tort for that matter; rather it arose out of a trademark dis-
pute. The plaintiff, holder of a trademark on See’s Candy 
Shops, sought the identity of the person, persons or entity 
that registered two domain names: seescandy.com and see-
candys.com.  The two domain names were registered 
anonymously with Network Solutions, Inc. 
Finally, there is a sense, expressed more definitely in latter 
cases discussed below, of necessity in granting the plain-
tiff’s subpoena request, i.e., that redress (begun by “ser-
vice of process”) due the plaintiff by the defendant is not 
otherwise possible without the divulgation of the identity 
of the anonymous speaker or speakers (“the plaintiff 
should file a request for discovery with the Court, along 
with a statement of reasons justifying the specific discov-
ery requested as well as identification of a limited number 
of persons or entities on whom discovery process might be 
served and for which there is a reasonable likelihood that 
the discovery process will lead to identifying information 
about defendant that would make service of process possi-
ble” 580).  Can the identity be determined without the ser-
vice provider or other intermediary revealing the identity 
of the anonymous speaker?  If so, then the necessity re-
quirement has not been met and the court will not exercise 
its subpoena power to compel divulgation of the identify-
ing information from the service provider or other party 
holding the information.  
The court employed the use of four factors or safeguards 
to “ensure that this unusual procedure [the issuance of a 
subpoena ordering the release of the identity of an anony-
mous domain name registrant and alleged trademark in-
fringer] will only be employed in cases where the plaintiff 
has in good faith exhausted traditional avenues for identi-
fying a civil defendant pre-service, and will prevent use of 
this method to harass or intimidate.” (Columbia Insurance 
Co. v. Seescandy.com, 578) 
The first factor identified establishes that a court has the 
right to exert control over the questionable behavior.  In 
law this is know as jurisdiction.  As a practical matter ju-
risdiction is a way of saying that there is agreement on the 
standard of conduct (expressed in the law of the jurisdic-
tion) by which to evaluate the claim made by the plaintiff 
of harm caused by the defendant.  In Columbia Insurance 
Co. v. Seescandy.com the court required that “the plaintiff 
should identify the missing party with sufficient specificity 
such that the Court can determine that defendant is a real 
person or entity who could be sued in federal court.” (578)   
The facts of In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to American 
Online, Inc. (Table 2b.) are somewhat different; here the 
plaintiffs or party requesting disclosure (itself proceeding 
under the pseudonym “Anonymous Publicly Traded Com-
pany) alleged that comments posted to chat rooms by five 
John Doe participants were defamatory, misrepresentative 
and if made by certain knowledgeable persons such as 
employees constituted a breach of fiduciary duties and 
contractual obligations of those individuals owed to the 
company.”  The Virginia court began with a discussion of 
the precedent protecting anonymous speech.  Since the 
granting of the order would have involved a governmental 
function, i.e., the court ordered release of John Doe identi-
ties, the court placed its continued analysis within a consti-
tutional (free speech) context.  In addition to the historical 
and judicial precedent and the application of those con-
cepts to the Internet speech, the court also pointed out that 
piercing the veil of Internet anonymity might also harm in 
an economic sense, an online service provider such as 
American Online, by driving customers away from Amer-
ica Online, to other service providers that are more vigi-
lant in protecting their customer’s privacy. (In re Subpoena 
Duces Tecum to American Online, Inc., 32) 
The court was also concerned that such requests by plain-
tiffs do not turn in routine “hunting” exercises and chill 
speech on the Internet. This requires plaintiffs demonstrate 
good faith.  In Columbia Insurance Co. v. Seescandy.com 
the court looked to two types of good faith. One good faith 
factor is derived from the plaintiff’s actions and might be 
viewed as accomplishing an internal consistency of sorts 
as it looks at factors internal to the litigation, i.e., the 
plaintiff’s actions (“the party should identify all previous 
steps taken to locate the elusive defendant. This element is 
aimed at ensuring that plaintiffs make a good faith effort to 
comply with the requirements of service of process and 
specifically identifying defendants,” 579).  The other good 
faith factor is derived from the legal merits of the case or 
the claim the plaintiff is making (“plaintiff should estab-
lish to the Court's satisfaction that plaintiff's suit against 
defendant could withstand a motion to dismiss,” 579).  
This might be called “legal” good faith; it is an assessment 
made by the court to the facts at hand and thus is external 
in character.  The good faith of the plaintiff whereas is an 
internal factor and is dependant upon how the plaintiff has 
conducted him or herself. Both factors relate to the consis-
tency of legal process as meeting these two factors ensures 
that there is merit to both the plaintiff’s actions and his or 
her legal claim. 
The court pointed to three criteria that must be satisfied: “a 
court should only order a non-party, Internet service pro-
vider to provide information concerning the identity of a 
subscriber (1) when the court is satisfied by the pleadings 
or evidence supplied to that court (2) that the party re-
questing the subpoena has a legitimate, good faith basis to 
contend that it may be the victim of conduct actionable in 
the jurisdiction where suit was filed and (3) the subpoe-
naed identity information is centrally needed to advance 
that claim.” (In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to American 
Online, Inc., 37)   
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Analyzing the two cases, there is consistency between the 
criteria used in Columbia Insurance Co. v. Seescandy.com 
and the criteria used in In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to 
American Online, Inc.  (See Table 2 and Table 3.)  For 
example, the “satisfied by the pleadings or evidence” of In 
re Subpoena Duces Tecum to American Online, Inc. is 
similar to the “withstand a motion to dismiss” of Columbia 
Insurance Co. v. Seescandy.com.  This prong represents a 
“legal” good faith requirement, imposed upon the court, 
that the allegations meet the legal requirements of a basic 
and viable claim.   
Finally, the “identity information is centrally needed to 
advance the claim” language is taken from American On-
line’s own anonymous speaker divulgation policy (“AOL 
acknowledged on brief that it has complied with hundreds 
of similar subpoenas issued by Virginia courts when it has 
been satisfied (1) that the party seeking the information 
has pleaded with specificity a prima facie claim that it is 
the victim of particular, specified tortious conduct and (2) 
that the subpoenaed identity information was centrally 
needed to advance the claim. AOL's Supplemental Memo-
randum In Support of Motion To Quash at 4-5.” In re Sub-
poena Duces Tecum to American Online, Inc., 27, note 2).  
This is the necessity factor also present in Columbia In-
surance Co. v. Seescandy.com (“reasonable 
likelihood...would make service of process possible”). 
Case Problem  Factors  Balance 
In re Subpoena 
Duces Tecum to 
America Online, 
Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26 
(2000). 
 
Facts: 
Plaintiffs claim that 
five John Does in 
chat rooms  pub-
lished defamatory 
material, misrepre-
sentations, and con-
fidential material in 
breach of fiduciary 
duties and contrac-
tual obligations 
owed to plaintiffs. 
 
 
 
Release allowed. 
Whether the “subpoena 
duces tecum issued by the 
Clerk of this Court unrea-
sonably impairs the First 
Amendment rights of the 
John Does to speak 
anonymously on the Inter-
net and therefore should be 
quashed...” 
“[W]hether a state’s inter-
est in protecting its citi-
zens against potentially 
actionable communica-
tions on the Internet is 
sufficient to outweigh the 
right to anonymously 
speak on this ever-
expanding medium.” 
Legal “Good Faith”: Claim  
(External Consistency) 
“[W]hen the court is satisfied by the plead-
ings or evidence supplied to that court...” 
 
Good Faith: Party (Internal Consistency) 
 
Jurisdiction:(Standard of Conduct)  
“...that the party requesting the subpoena 
has a legitimate, good faith basis to con-
tend that it may be the victim of conduct 
actionable in the jurisdiction where suit 
was filed and...” 
 
Necessity: Basic (as to party/claim) 
“...the subpoenaed identity information is 
centrally needed to advance that claim.” 
Potential chilling impact of 
subpoena: “It cannot be seri-
ously questioned that those who 
utilize the ‘chat room’ and 
‘message boards’ of AOL do so 
with an expectation that the 
anonymity of their postings and 
communications generally will 
be protected.” 
 
“If AOL did not uphold the 
confidentiality of its subscrib-
ers, as it has contracted to do, 
absent extraordinary circum-
stances, one could reasonably 
predict that AOL subscribers 
would look to AOL’s competi-
tors for anonymity.” “Those 
who suffer damages as a result 
of tortuous or other actionable 
communications on the Internet 
should be able to seek appro-
priate redress by preventing the 
wrong-doers from hiding be-
hind an illusory shield of pur-
ported First Amendment 
rights.” 
 
Balance: right to speak with the 
right of redress, the duty owed 
customers and the prevention of 
the loss of the ability to com-
pete. *** 
Table 2b. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to American Online, Inc. 
The second In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to American 
Online, Inc. factor contains two elements also present in 
the earlier Columbia Insurance Co. v. Seescandy.com for-
mulation: the “good faith basis to contend” is viewed as a 
good faith requirement as to the moving party (internal 
consistency) and the “conduct actionable in the jurisdic-
tion,” the more general jurisdictional requirement, i.e., that 
this is the proper court before which to bring the action.   
Another case for review (Table 2c) presents a different 
posture between the plaintiff, the party moving for disclo-
sure and the anonymous speakers.  In Doe v. 
2TheMart.com, Inc., the anonymous speakers were not 
alleged to have caused harm to the plaintiffs.  Rather the 
shareholders of 2TheMart.com alleged that the company’s 
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directors and officers engaged in wrongdoing that harmed 
the shareholders and so brought what is known in corpo-
rate law as a “derivative action” or lawsuit against those 
directors and officers in a separate but thus related litiga-
tion.  The directors and officers (the defendants in the re-
lated lawsuit but the party moving for disclosure in this 
case) believed that the true perpetrators of the harm were 
the anonymous posters of the messages on boards operated 
by InfoSpace, an online service provider, in specific, on its 
Silicon Investor website.   
This action was brought by those directors and officers to 
compel release of the identity of the anonymous speakers 
in order to question them and gain evidence that might 
exculpate them as defendants in the separate but related 
shareholder derivative action.  This is a critical distinction 
between the Doe v. 2TheMart.com, and the previous Inc In 
re Subpoena Duces Tecum to American Online, Inc., and 
Columbia Insurance Co. v. Seescandy.com cases. In the 
latter two cases, discussed earlier, the perpetrator of the 
harm and the anonymous speaker, thus the target of the 
plaintiff’s motion for identity disclosure were one and the 
same person or persons.  Whereas in Doe v. 
2TheMart.com, the anonymous speakers were not the ob-
jects of the plaintiffs claim (the shareholders as plaintiffs 
against the directors and officers as defendants).  Rather it 
was the defendant directors and officers, as the moving 
party, who sought the identity of anonymous posters in 
order to secure their defense in the related (derivative) 
shareholder litigation.  
Case Problem  Factors  Balance 
Doe v. 
2TheMart.com, 
Inc., 140 F. 
Supp.2d 1088 
(W.D. Wash. 
2001).* 
Facts: 
Defendant, (Party 
B), sought the iden-
tity of 23 speakers 
(Party C) who par-
ticipated anony-
mously on an 
online board, in 
order to ascertain 
whether the 23 
speakers could 
provide a defense 
for Party B in its 
dispute with 
2TheMart.com 
shareholders (Party 
A), in Party A’s 
derivative class 
action against 
2TM.com officers 
and directors (Party 
B).  
 
Released denied. 
“[W]hat is the scope of an 
individual’s First Amend-
ment right to speak anony-
mously on the Internet” and 
“what showing must be 
made by a private party 
seeking to discover the 
identity of anonymous 
Internet users through the 
enforcement of a civil sub-
poena?” 
Good Faith: Party (Internal Consistency) 
Whether “the subpoena seeking the infor-
mation was issued in good faith and not for 
any improper purpose.”  
 
Legal “Good Faith”: Claim 
(External Consistency) 
Whether the “information is needed to ad-
vance core claims or defenses?” “The in-
formation sought by TMRT 
[2TheMart.com] does not relate to a core 
defense. Here, the information relates to 
only one of twenty-seven affirmative de-
fenses raised by the defendant...” 
The information “relates only to a secon-
dary claim or to one of numerous affirma-
tive defenses.” 
 
Necessity: Basic (as to party/claim) 
Whether the “identifying information [is] 
directly and materially relevant to a core 
claim or defense?” “Unlike in Sees-
candy.com and American Online, Inc. their 
identity is not needed to allow the litigation 
to proceed.” 
 
Necessity: Absolute (as to claim) 
“TMRT [2TheMart.com] has failed to 
demonstrate that the information it needs to 
establish its defense is unavailable from 
any other source.  The chat room messages 
are archived and are available to anyone to 
read and print.” 
“The subpoena would have re-
quired the disclosure 
of...information that has no rele-
vance to the issues raised in the 
lawsuit. This apparent disregard 
for the privacy and the First 
Amendment rights of the online 
users, while not demonstrating bad 
faith per se, weighs against TMRT 
[2TheMart.com] in balancing the 
interests here.” 
“[F]ree exchange of ideas on the 
Internet is driven in large part by 
the ability of Internet users to 
communicate anonymously.” 
“If Internet users could be stripped 
of that anonymity...this would 
have a significant chilling effect 
on Internet communications and 
thus on basic First Amendment 
rights.” 
Balance: of litigant’s right of re-
dress (“necessity”: basic and abso-
lute) in third party matters with 
First Amendment rights, including 
the right to speak anonymously. 
Table 2c. Doe v. 2The Mart.com, Inc.
As a result, the Doe v. 2TheMart.com court adapted a 
slightly different but no less consistent configuration in its 
analysis. Like the Inc In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to 
American Online, Inc. court, the federal district court re-
viewed the existing Supreme Court precedent on anony-
mous speech.  The district court also undertook its discus-
sion cognizant of both the Columbia Insurance Co. v. 
Seescandy.com and Inc In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to 
American Online, Inc. decisions. 
The Doe v. 2TheMart.com court adopted the following 
four-part test: “(1) the subpoena seeking the information 
was issued in good faith and not for any improper purpose, 
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(2) the information sought relates to a core claim or de-
fense, (3) the identifying information is directly and mate-
rially relevant to that claim or defense, and (4) information 
sufficient to establish or to disprove that claim or defense 
is unavailable from any other source.” (Doe v. 2The 
Mart.com 1095, 1097)  While there is no clear factor relat-
ing to jurisdiction, the Doe v. 2TheMart.com configuration 
is still consistent with the previous cases as to the re-
quirement of a jurisdictional standard.  This is so for one 
of two reasons.  Jurisdiction might to some extent be either 
implied, or in the alternative, it is not required because this 
case unlike the others involves the actions of third parties.  
In other words, the jurisdiction or standard of conduct un-
der which the actions of the anonymous speaker-
perpetrators is to be judged is not relevant to this immedi-
ate issue of divulgation because the initial dispute (share-
holders versus directors) is not before the court at this 
time.   
Unfortunately for the directors and officers this informa-
tion was indeed available from other sources, including the 
message board where the postings were originally made, 
thus the court denied their request to issue an order to re-
lease the identity of the anonymous speakers.  
In this way the three cases discussed herein are consistent 
with each other considering the different juxtaposition of 
parties in the third case, Doe v. 2TheMart.com.  The re-
quirement that the identity information be “directly and 
materially relevant to a core claim or defense” represents 
the necessity (basic) requirement of the Columbia Insur-
ance Co. v. Seescandy.com (“requirements of service of 
process”) and Inc In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Ameri-
can Online, Inc. (“centrally needed to advance that claim”) 
courts.  However, here, because the Doe v. 2TheMart.com 
anonymous speaker is a third party there appears a slightly 
ascending standard among the three courts’ basic necessity 
factor (see Table 3).  Moreover, the court in Doe v. 
2TheMart.com imposed an additional necessity criterion.  
This is called absolute necessity: “information it needs to 
establish its defense is unavailable from any other source.”  
Not only must the identity of the anonymous speaker be 
materially relevant (basic necessity) to the dispute between 
the parties, it must be unavailable elsewhere (absolute ne-
cessity).  As observed earlier, the court found the plain-
tiff’s reasoning flawed, as the information was readily 
available from various chat room archives. 
Of the four factors (less jurisdiction) the Doe v. 
2TheMart.com did develop, three are consistent with both 
the remaining factors of the Columbia Insurance Co. v. 
Seescandy.com and Inc In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to 
American Online, Inc. courts.  In Doe v. 2TheMart.com 
there is both internal (as to party) and external (as to 
claim) consistency that are labeled good faith and “legal” 
good faith, respectively.  The subpoena, in order to be 
granted must be “issued in good faith and not for any im-
proper purpose” and it must relate to the advancement of 
“core claims or defenses.”  Unfortunately, the identity in-
formation related to only one of twenty-seven defenses 
and so the court concluded that its standards were not met.  
This is significant because unlike the Columbia Insurance 
Co. v. Seescandy.com and In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to 
American Online, Inc. courts, the court here did not grant 
the request of the directors and officers and refused to or-
der the release of the identity of the anonymous posters. 
Two final cases, Dendrite International, Inc. v. John Doe 
No. 3 and Immunomedics, Inc. v. Doe, (Table 2d) are com-
panion decisions released on the same day by the same 
court.  While decided after Doe v. 2TheMart.com, neither 
of these two refers to the Doe v. 2TheMart.com decision.  
However, both Columbia Insurance Co. v. Seescandy.com 
and In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to American Online, Inc. 
are referred to by the lead decision in Dendrite Interna-
tional, Inc. v. John Doe No. 3.  The internal consistency 
factor used by in Dendrite International, Inc. v. John Doe 
No. 3, good faith as to party (“identify and set forth the 
exact statements purportedly made by each anonymous 
poster that plaintiff alleges constitute actionable speech”) 
is present. However, the court suggests that the plaintiffs 
must “undertake efforts to notify the anonymous posters” 
and “afford the fictitiously-named defendants a reasonable 
opportunity to file and serve opposition to the applica-
tion.”  Yet, the court does not also intend a situation where 
the entire proceedings be conducted with the defendant 
incognito: “To allow a potential tortfeasor to disprove a 
plaintiff’s case before the plaintiff is even provide the op-
portunity to learn the defendant’s identity, let alone gather 
any discovery, has no foundation in New Jersey law.” 775 
A.2d at 778.   
Factors three and four both relate to necessity, but as this 
case involves the divulgation of a third party actor. The 
moving party, the “defendant” directors and officers were 
not requesting the information before proceeds against the 
anonymous speaker as perpetrator of some harm, but 
rather will ultimately use the information to proceed or 
defend against a different party (the shareholders) in an-
other case (the derivative by shareholders against them).  
Here, the directors and officers needed the identity of the 
anonymous speakers in order to prepare a defense in the 
related case.  As a result of the “once removed” relation-
ship or third party nature of the anonymous speaker to the 
litigant (not needed in order to seek redress but in order to 
defend itself against another plaintiff seeking redress), the 
court expanded the necessity factor to include a require-
ment of what might best be labeled absolute necessity: 
“that the information it needs to establish its defense is 
unavailable from any other source.”   
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While there is no specific mention of jurisdiction, it may 
be implied here as well from the “subject of a subpoena or 
application” requirement.  An external consistency (“le-
gal” good faith) is also present: “The complaint and all 
information provided to the court should be carefully re-
viewed to determine whether plaintiff has set forth a prima 
facie cause of action against the fictitiously-named 
anonymous defendants...establishing that its action can 
withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted...the plaintiff must pro-
duce sufficient evidence supporting each element of its 
cause of action, on a prima facie basis, prior to a court or-
dering the disclosure of the identity of the unnamed defen-
dant.”  Passing a prima facie test in essence requires the 
court to apply the law of the jurisdiction to the alleged 
facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff thus ensuring 
consistency in its proceedings.  Finally a factor relating the 
basic necessity is included, i.e., that the “necessity for the 
disclosure of the anonymous defendant’s identity [is 
needed] to allow the plaintiff to properly proceed.”  How-
ever in applying the same criteria the Dendrite Interna-
tional, Inc. v. John Doe No. 3 and Immunomedics, Inc. v. 
Doe courts respectively reached different results, in the 
former case the court maintained the anonymity of the 
speakers while in the latter case the court supported re-
lease of the identity of the anonymous posters.   
Case Problem** Factors**  Balance 
Dendrite Interna-
tional Inc. v. John 
Doe No. 3., 775 
A.2d 756 (N.J. Su-
per. Ct. 2001).* 
 
Facts: 
 
Identity of anony-
mous speaker 
sought by company 
claiming he/she 
defamed company 
by posting several 
comments regard-
ing corporate ac-
counting practices 
regarding its corpo-
rate earnings. 
 
Release denied. 
 
Immun-omedics, 
Inc. v. Doe, 775 
A.2d 773 (N.J. Su-
per.Ct. 2001). 
 
Facts: 
Identity of anony-
mous poster of 
messages sought by 
company suspecting 
speaker was an 
employee, claims 
include breach of 
contract, legal duty 
of loyalty, negli-
gence, tortious in-
terference.  
 
Release allowed. 
“We offer the following 
guidelines to trial courts 
when faced with an appli-
cation by a plaintiff for 
expedited discovery seek-
ing an order compelling 
an ISP to honor a sub-
poena and disclose the 
identity of anonymous 
Internet posters who are 
sued for allegedly violat-
ing the rights of individu-
als or businesses.”** 
Good Faith: Party (Internal Consistency) 
“[F]irst require the plaintiff to undertake efforts 
to notify the anonymous posters that they are 
the subject of a subpoena or application for an 
order of disclosure, and withhold action to af-
ford to the fictitiously-named defendants a rea-
sonable opportunity to file and serve opposition 
to the application.”** 
“The court shall also require the plaintiff to 
identify and set forth the exact statements pur-
portedly made by each anonymous poster that 
plaintiff alleges constitute actionable 
speech.”** 
 
“Legal” Good Faith: Claim  
(External Consistency) 
“The complaint and all information provided to 
the court should be carefully reviewed to de-
termine whether plaintiff has set forth a prima 
facie cause of action against the fictitiously-
named anonymous defendants. 
In addition to establishing that its action can 
withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted 
pursuant to R. 4:6-2(f), the plaintiff must pro-
duce sufficient evidence supporting each ele-
ment of its cause of action, on a prima facie 
basis, prior to a court ordering the disclosure of 
the identity of the unnamed defendant.”** 
 
Necessity: Basic (as to party or claim) 
“Finally, assuming the court concludes that the 
plaintiff has presented a prima facie cause of 
action, the court must balance the defendant’s 
First Amendment right of anonymous free 
speech against the strength of the prima facie 
case presented and the necessity for the disclo-
sure of the anonymous defendant’s identity to 
allow the plaintiff to properly proceed.”** 
“The trial court must consider 
and decide those applications 
by striking a balance between 
the well- established First 
Amendment right to speak 
anonymously, and the right of 
the plaintiff to protect its pro-
prietary interests and reputa-
tion through the assertion of 
recognizable claims based on 
the actionable conduct of the 
fictitiously-named defen-
dants.”** 
 
“In balancing Moonshine’s 
right of anonymous free speech 
against the strength of the 
prima facie case presented and 
the necessity for disclosure, it 
is clear that the motion judge 
struck [sic] the proper balance 
in favor of identity disclosure.” 
**      
*** 
 
Balance:  right to speak 
anonymously with the right of 
redress and the right to protect 
proprietary interests.  
Table 2d. Dendrite International Inc. v. John Doe No. 3. and Immun-omedics, Inc. v. Doe 
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The Dendrite International, Inc. v. John Doe No. 3 in-
volved a claim of defamation resulting from statements 
posted on an online bulletin board dedicated to Dendrite 
investors that adversely affected the value of the stock of 
the plaintiff corporation.  In Immunomedics, Inc. v. Doe, 
breach of contract and tortuous interference with economic 
Case  Columbia Insurance 
Co. Seescandy.com, 
185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. 
(Cal. 1999). 
In re Subpoena Duces 
Tecum to America 
Online, Inc., 52 Va. 
Cir.26 (2000).**** 
Doe v. 2TheMartcom, 
Inc, 140 F. Supp. 2d 
(W.D. Wash. 2001). 
*** 
Dendrite International, 
Inc., 775 A.2d 756 N.J. 
Super. Ct. 2001). 
Immuno-medics, Inc., 
775 A.2d 773 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. 2001).**** 
Factor:      
Jurisdiction Standard 
of Conduct 
person or entity who 
could be sued in fed-
eral court 
victim of conduct ac-
tionable in the jurisdic-
tion where suit filed  
implied or not neces-
sary???? 
implied???? 
subject of a subpoena 
or application 
Good Faith: Party 
(Internal Consis-
tency) 
comply with require-
ments of service of 
process 
legitimate, good faith 
basis to contend that it 
may be the victim... 
issued in good faith 
and not for any im-
proper purpose 
efforts to notify,***** 
actionable speech  
“Legal” Good Faith: 
Claim (External 
Consistency)* 
withstand a motion to 
dismiss 
pleadings or evidence 
supplied 
core claims or defenses  prima facie, withstand 
a motion to dismiss, 
sufficient evidence 
Necessity: Basic 
(party/claim)** 
limited number of 
persons and make 
service of process 
possible 
identity information 
centrally needed to 
advance that claim 
identity information 
[is] directly and mate-
rially relevant to ad-
vance a core claim or 
defense 
necessity for the dis-
closure...to allow the 
plaintiff to properly 
proceed 
Necessity: Absolute 
(claim) 
not applicable  not applicable  information it needs to 
establish its defense is 
unavailable from any 
other source 
 
Notes:  
*The information in a third party action (Doe v. 2TheMart.com, Inc.) must relate to a “core claim or defense,” not merely relate to the 
pleadings as a whole, i.e., withstanding a “motion to dismiss” as in Seescandy.com or found in the “pleadings or evidence” of the 
America Online dispute. 
**Regarding the necessity factor, there is a subtle but increasing standard in the three cases progressing from “make service of process 
possible” (Seescandy.com) to “centrally needed to advance the claim” (America Online) to “directly and materially relevant” 
(2TheMart.com).  The 2TheMart.com court cited favorably both previous cases.  
***When the dispute involves third party action—the person seeking to discover the identity does not seek remedy from the anony-
mous speaker—there is less need for the identity to be revealed.  In these circumstances the “jurisdiction” factor is implied or not 
relevant as the actual dispute between the plaintiff and defendant may take place in other jurisdiction altogether.  In order for the iden-
tity of a third party defamer to be revealed it must be “directly and materially relevant to a core defense” and supplemented or re-
placed entirely by a higher standard of necessity: the litigation of the plaintiff against the third party cannot proceed unless the veil of 
anonymity is pierced.  This higher, additional standard of necessity is labeled “absolute” as the “information it [the moving party, i.e., 
2TheMart.com] needs to establish its defense is unavailable from any other source.”  This higher standard in third party actions was 
observed in Doe v. 2TheMart.com: “The standard for disclosing the identity of a non-party witness must be higher than that articulated 
in Seescandy.com and America Online, Inc. When the anonymous Internet user is not a party to the case, the litigation can go forward 
without the disclosure of their identity.” (140 F. Supp 2d at 1095.) 
****Though not included as a specific factor, both the America Online, Inc. and Immunomedics, Inc. v. Doe cases phrased the ultimate 
use of the factors as offering assistance to courts in balancing the right to speak anonymously with potential impact that speech might 
have upon the proprietary interest of the plaintiff, either in the loss of future Internet speakers as customers to America Online in Amer-
ica Online or in harms perpetrated against the plaintiff itself in Immunomedics, Inc. v. Doe. 
***** The standard articulated by the New Jersey court in the Dendrite International, Inc. v. John Doe No. 3 and Immunomedics, Inc. 
v. Doe cases suggest a factor that anticipates the anonymous speaker be given notice of the impending divulgation: “We hold that 
when such an application is made, the trial court should first require the plaintiff to undertake efforts to notify the anonymous posters 
that they are the subject of a subpoena or application for an order of disclosure, and withhold action to afford the fictitiously-named 
defendants a reasonable opportunity to file and serve opposition to the application. These notification efforts should include posting a 
message of notification of the identity discovery request to the anonymous user on the ISP's pertinent message board.” 775 A.2d at 
761, and repeated again at 775 A.2d 773. 
Table 3. Summary 
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interest were among numerous claims made by a corpora-
tion that suspected an employee was behind the anony-
mous postings of proprietary information.  The decision of 
the Immunomedics, Inc. v. Doe court to support divulga-
tion of the identity of the speakers is contrasted with Den-
drite International, Inc. v. John Doe No. 3 where the re-
viewing court agreed with the trial court and concluded 
that the insufficient evidence presented did not warrant 
release of the identity information: “The record does not 
support the conclusion that John Doe's postings negatively 
affected the value of Dendrite's stock, nor does Dendrite 
offer evidence or information that these postings have ac-
tually inhibited its hiring practices, as it alleged they 
would.” Whereas in Immunomedics, Inc. v. Doe, the court 
felt that the plaintiffs had demonstrated that “Moonshine 
[the pseudonym of the anonymous poster] is an employee 
of Immunomedics, that employees execute confidentiality 
agreements, and the content of Moonshine's posted mes-
sages providing evidence of the breach thereof, the disclo-
sure of Moonshine's identity, which can be reasonably cal-
culated to be achieved by information obtained from the 
subpoena, was fully warranted.” The circumstances of 
these two cases suggest that courts may consider whether 
the anonymous posting might harm the proprietary interest 
of the aggrieved party.   
Finally, the resulting difference in the outcomes between 
two cases from the same court with similar facts is also 
important because it suggests that the criteria used to de-
termine whether or not a court will support the release of 
identity information of anonymous speakers is not reduced 
to a bright line test or a sole factor of the whether the iden-
tity is related to a primary party as speaker (released in 
Columbia Insurance Co. v. Seescandy.com and Inc In re 
Subpoena Duces Tecum to American Online, Inc.) versus a 
third party as speaker (release denied in Doe v. 2The 
Mart.com), but may vary between two first party cases.   
The New Jersey cases, both involving actions claimed to 
harm the proprietary interest of a corporation, are thus 
consistent with the developing formulation of other courts 
requiring two aspects of good faith, one as to party the 
other as to claim, another factor involving jurisdiction and 
a fourth concept of necessity, which is at least basic 
(needed to proceed) and may be absolute in third party 
actions (unavailable from any other source). (See Table 3)  
Incorporating Developing Legal 
Standards into  
Institutional Decision-Making 
Courts have been consistent in the analysis of the factors 
that must be present before a court will either order en-
forcement of a discovery subpoena or a issue a subpoena 
of its own accord, and in either case pierce the veil of 
anonymous Internet speech. For example, America Online 
contended that it was unwilling to comply with the sub-
poena and release the names of the anonymous speakers 
because the company requesting the release refused to re-
veal is own identity, as a result the court issued a subpoena 
for release of the identity information.  It should be ob-
served that none of the criteria require in specific that the 
anonymous speaker be given notice that his or her identity 
is about to be revealed.  Only the Dendrite International, 
Inc. v. John Doe No. 3 and Immunomedics, Inc. v. Doe 
court believed that notice should be first given in order to 
offer the anonymous a speaker an opportunity to respond 
to an impending divulgation of his or her identity.  This 
suggests that a service provider or other entity could at 
least notify the anonymous poster of the impending release 
of his or her identity, consistent with the Dendrite Interna-
tional, Inc. v. John Doe No. 3 and Immunomedics, Inc. v. 
Doe decisions.  
In most cases the intermediary will either release the in-
formation on their own accord, or deny the request for 
release by the plaintiff in which instance several of the 
resulting cases have arisen.  These factors can be used to 
construct institutional disclosure policies that indicate to 
the speaker—the customer, student or employee—when 
the veil of his or her anonymity will be pierced.   
It is obvious that the standards courts employ will influ-
ence both the policies that institutions adopt and the deci-
sion-making it undertakes.  Moreover, the standards articu-
lated by courts may influence in specific those entities 
such as online service providers that field requests from 
third parties for release of customer identity information.  
This was evident in the Inc In re Subpoena Duces Tecum 
to American Online, Inc. (AOL policy reprinted in foot-
note 2 and discussed at pages 27-28 of the decision).  Con-
sider the Yahoo! Policy at issue in Dendrite International, 
Inc. v. John Doe No. 3 and Immunomedics, Inc. v. Doe.  
The policy allowed release of identity information in one 
of three circumstances: 1) with the permission of the 
speaker, 2) in “special circumstances,” when Yahoo! “be-
lieves in good faith that the law requires it,” or 3) when it 
is necessary to identify, contact or bring legal action 
against someone who may be violating Yahoo!'s Terms of 
Service or may be causing injury to...anyone...that could 
be harmed by such activities,” as quoted in Dendrite In-
ternational, Inc. v. John Doe No. 3 (775 A.2d at 762).  
While adopting policy language linking institutional re-
sponses to developing legal standards or the reality of third 
party harms (ultimately determined by existing legal stan-
dards) might appear to provide the institution with some-
what of a legal or moral imperative to release the identity 
information it also requires cognizance of the developing 
law.   
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Consider Internet scenarios where the words of anony-
mous speakers may arguably cause harm and where the 
aggrieved party or some other party at interest might de-
sire to know the source of the anonymous speech.  It is 
obvious that an outside party might seek the disclosure of 
a customer, student or employee, in conjunction with a 
legal dispute if that individual has perpetrated some mal-
feasance against the outside party.  In those cases the fac-
tors articulated in the previous discussion would apply.  
See, Table 2 and Table 3.  However, these factors can also 
be adapted and used to guide “disputes” that might arise 
internally within an institution as well.  Here it is contem-
plated that no actual legal action would be taken, but an 
Intranet web master or other institutional online adminis-
trator or one acting in a similar capacity as a “watchdog” 
might receive internal requests for the release of identity 
information.  In response the institution might look to the 
developing precedent and adapt the criteria for use in its 
own internal unique decision-making setting.  
There are several benefits to this approach.  The modeling 
of institutional policies for internal use consistent with 
developing precedent can help preserve a spirit of free 
speech, yet allow for the continued functioning of the or-
ganization. Such policies can also be easily adapted to ap-
ply in situations where the request is from an external 
source and would then mirror the case law more precisely. 
In the latter external-request scenario, a legally consistent 
policy could save the institution time and legal entangle-
ment, as it would have the determinative factors already 
incorporated into its operating policies. In the former in-
ternal-request scenario, there may result a positive impact 
upon morale, as members of the organization base deci-
sions on articulated standards, which in the present discus-
sion attempt to incorporate common values such as free 
speech, privacy, anonymity, etc. As a result, this offers 
consistency between external (request from a third party) 
and internal (request coming from within the organization) 
decision-making. 
Institutions such as commercial entities, schools or em-
ployers may wish to apply or adapt these evolving stan-
dards to situations likely to occur in their respective inter-
nal settings.  Consider the following three scenarios: one 
from e-commerce, one from an educational environment 
and another in an employer-employee context.  Suppose a 
web site proprietor would like to share customer informa-
tion with another product or service department within the 
organization or with a related entity such as a subsidiary, 
or a school administrator would like to identify the student 
who posted a malicious message suggesting that the stu-
dent-poster is the one behind recent acts of vandalism at 
the school, or an employer would like to identify an 
anonymous employee who may be engaging in a pattern of 
harassment of other employees or customers, or making 
improper (but not otherwise unlawful) comments about the 
employee or customer. (See Table 4)  (It should be noted 
that this discussion does not incorporate the relevance of 
other laws that may forbid release of information to third 
parties, such as federal privacy legislation governing the 
release of customer information or student records.  If this 
is a concern to the institution, then the custodian of the 
information should obtain the consent of the speaker as a 
condition of service, access or employment, as most laws 
contain a consent exception.  The incorporation of these 
principles into the institutional structure demonstrates how 
legal precedent may impact the development of fair infor-
mation practices even though, in light of the consent of the 
speaker, there would be no legal obligation to maintain the 
confidentiality of the information.)  
How can the four factors be applied to institutional set-
tings and guide decision-making in determining when it 
might be prudent to release the identity of anonymous 
posters either internally or externally to third parties?  As 
with the application of these factors in the subpoena or 
court order scenarios, all four factors must be present or 
the release of identity cannot be made.  In addition, the 
examples of the factors might be applied in the scenarios 
presented serve as mere suggestions, as particular institu-
tions might derive their own “interpretations” of a how 
factor such as necessity might be applied. 
Applying the jurisdiction factor would suggest that the 
anonymous speech occurred using the institution’s tech-
nology or somehow relates to subject or context of the 
institution.  For an e-educational setting this might mean 
that the harmful posting was made by students using the 
school’s computer network and related to a school spon-
sored activity.  For an e-commerce or employer-employee 
scenario this might mean that only the identity of current 
employees or customers could be released as opposed to 
former or future employees or customers.  Different insti-
tutions could define the limits of this “jurisdiction” differ-
ently, but the concept remains the same, approximating the 
logical limits of subjects over which the institution has 
control.   
The second, internal good faith factor might require that 
an employer not pierce that veil of anonymity for the sole 
purpose of snooping on what employees are saying to each 
other or about customers.  Instead the identity of an em-
ployee could be released as part of an internal network 
“audit” in response to some perceived harm, i.e., in order 
to curb misuse of its system or to investigate the posting of 
harassing messages by employees, or to perform routine  
(as opposed to extraordinary, i.e., repeated and invasive) 
“business” or performance monitoring of employees.  This 
concept of “ordinary course of business” or “legitimate 
business purpose” is often used in other contexts such as 
the regulation of privacy and electronic communications 
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under federal law (18 U.S.C. §2510 et seq.) and could be 
adopted here as well.   
The third factor, of “legal” good faith might require com-
pliance with various disclosure requirements. In the same 
way courts made an assessment based upon the existing 
law so too does the organization use some measure by 
which to assess of conforming behavior, such as associa-
tion standards, industry best practices, etc.  As observed 
earlier, this might mean conformance to other information 
laws such as those protecting the privacy of student school 
or school library records. (See, Lipinski, 2001; Lipinski, 
1999)  In e-commerce settings it might suggest that the 
institution conform to developing industry standards of 
privacy/anonymity, or in employee performance monitor-
ing for example, to align practices with the developing 
law.  
Setting: e-Commerce*  Educational**  Environment   Employment*** 
Anonymous Speaker:   Customer  Student  Employee 
Factor:     
Jurisdiction Standard 
of Conduct 
current customer or “minimum 
contacts” of both parties via web 
established**** 
use of premise or property and 
related to school sponsored ac-
tivity 
same standard: premise or prop-
erty or current customer or con-
tacts  
Good Faith: Party 
(Internal Consistency) 
notice to customer prior to re-
lease: consent or expresses ini-
tial interest 
promote school safety or in-
crease effectiveness of educa-
tional process 
curb harassment or create a posi-
tive work environment 
“Legal” Good Faith: 
Claim  
(External Consistency) 
industry or developing regula-
tory standards 
compliance with federal, state 
laws district policy or other 
standards of conduct 
compliance with federal, state 
laws or company policy articu-
lating standards of conduct 
Necessity: Basic 
(party/claim) 
needed to process customer 
order or request 
needed in order to identify per-
petrators of harm or abuse 
needed in order to promote cor-
porate “civility code”  
Necessity: Absolute 
(claim)  
Not Applicable?: independent 
compilation of customer infor-
mation is cost prohibitive 
Not Applicable?: identity neces-
sary in order to curb vandalism, 
enforce tolerance or behavior 
policy 
Not Applicable?: unable to de-
termine breech agreement with-
out information from third party  
Proprietary Interest  Not Applicable?: loss of custom-
ers to competitors regarding new 
product or service development 
Not Applicable?: damage to 
physical environs or potential 
liability of school district 
Not applicable?: economic repu-
tation of company or good stand-
ing of customers affected  
Notes: 
*In the e-Commerce setting assume the customer interacts with the organization through the vendor web site anonymously, another 
service or product unit within the organization or a related entity such as a subsidiary desires to know the identity of an anonymous 
customer. (Note: this scenario presupposes that the e-commerce vendor is in compliance with other applicable privacy laws regarding 
the release of consumer information to third parties or has nonetheless obtained the consent of the customer as a condition of the initial 
service or product interaction.)  
**In the educational environment assume the school administration desires to know the source of anonymous student postings as the 
messages posted suggest the speakers are responsible for harms related to the school environment such as recent vandalism, might have 
information regarding the lack of compliance with a zero tolerance policy by other students or attempts to trace the source of recent 
derogatory postings about teachers or administrators or other unacceptable communications made through school computing facillites, 
i.e., in violation of a “school acceptable use” policy. 
***In the employment setting assume the employer would like to obtain the identity of anonymous posters (employees) who may be 
the perpetrators of harassing messages made with respect to other employees or disparaging comments about customers or the company 
itself. 
****“Minimum contacts” refers to a legal standard that is met when web site purveyors have conducted business through their web site 
sufficient to establish that there is enough interaction (minimum contacts) with web site visitors to subject the web site owner to legal 
jurisdiction in the home state of the web site visitor even though it may be different than the home state of the web site owner. The 
practical result is that the web site visitor-customer need not commence litigation in a different state than his or her own, such as the 
home state or jurisdiction of the web site owner, but can seek recourse from the court system in his or her own state. See, International 
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See also, David S. Godkin and Marc E. Betinsky, Personal Jurisdiction: If the [Interna-
tional] Shoe Fits, Wear It – But Does it Fit the Net?, JOURNAL OF INTERNET LAW, July, 1999, at 17, and the cases discussed 
therein. 
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Finally, the necessity factor might suggest that divulgation 
of a student’s identity would be released by school A (ap-
plying the factors) in response from a request from School 
B order to assist B in enforcing its zero tolerance policy.  
The request is made to school A by B for the identity of 
several of A’s students who might have witnessed a poten-
tial infraction of school B’s policy.  Another example of 
necessity might exist in the investigation of a possible 
breach of a non-compete or non-disclosure agreement in 
an e-commerce or employment context where employer A 
suspects that former employee C is engaging in conduct in 
violation of the agreement.  The request for information is 
made to employer B for customer information that A be-
lieves will help it determine whether or not C has violated 
the non-compete or non-disclosure agreement in force be-
tween A and C.  Both examples mirror the third party sce-
nario of the Doe v. 2The Mart.com case. In either case, the 
zero tolerance policy or the non-compete or non-disclosure 
agreement could not be enforced unless the institution—
the school or employer—knows the identity of a anony-
mous posters who can help it identify the deviation from 
the agreed upon behavior (tolerance policy or agreement).   
As commented earlier, the release of the customer, student 
or employee identity could not be made unless some as-
pect of each of the four factors was present in a given 
situation.  Incorporating such standards into internal insti-
tutional decision-making would impart a spirit of free 
speech and the right to speak anonymously that courts 
have attempted to preserve in legal proceedings.  Further-
more, conforming institutional releases of identity to third 
parties according to the four articulated standards would 
also align institutional policies with the developing legal 
precedent should a request for disclosure be made by an 
external third party in conjunction with related legal pro-
ceedings.  
Conclusion 
This paper discussed the developing precedent concerning 
anonymous speech on the Internet.  In specific, under what 
conditions will courts indorse the release of identity in-
formation relating to the anonymous speaker?  Having an 
understanding of these cases will help institutions articu-
late appropriate responses when faced with similar re-
quests for information from third parties or when the insti-
tution is itself the target of perceived harmful and anony-
mous speech, and it seeks to obtain the identity of the 
anonymous speaker.  While courts have adopted various 
standards, this paper synthesized these into four factors: 
jurisdiction, good faith as to party, good faith as to legal 
claim, and necessity (basic or absolute).  These standards 
can drive institutional decision-making, making it legally 
compliant (external requests for information), but factors 
can also be adopted to design internal policies and deci-
sion-making as well, and as a result contribute to an over-
all climate of compliance and consistency. 
Please Note: This paper is designed to provide accurate 
and authoritative information in regard to the subject mat-
ter covered.  However, this information is NOT provided 
as a substitute for legal advice.  If legal advice or expert 
assistance is required, the services of a competent legal 
professional should be sought. 
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